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Abstract: This article examines the rhetorical character of CBC Newsworld’s 2003
“re-trial” of Métis leader Louis Riel. Specifically, it considers how the broadcast
was presented as a gesture of reconciliation toward the Métis but was received by
Métis spokespersons as racist or colonizing. The broadcast is analyzed through
Robert Hariman’s conception of the popular trial as an occasion for the develop-
ment of argumentative resources to deliberate on problematic issues within public
culture. The broadcast and its reception are then analyzed critically to highlight the
tensions between identity, recognition, and reconciliation.
Résumé: Cet essai cerne les enjeux rhétoriques de la mise en scène en 2003 d’un
nouveau procès juridique de Louis Riel par CBC Newsworld. Il fait état du fait que
ce procès fut conçu comme un geste de réconciliation mais fut interprété par les
porte-parole des métis comme raciste ou colonisant. Selon cette analyse, l’émis-
sion contribue à une rhétorique de « procès populaire » qui, selon Robert Hariman,
offre des ressources argumentatives pour délibérer les controverses sociocul-
turelles. Par la suite, le programme et sa réception font l’objet d’une discussion cri-
tique portant sur les tensions entre l’identité, la reconnaissance et la réconciliation.
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On October 22, 2003, Newsworld, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s all-
news channel, revisited the case of Louis Riel, who was executed for high treason
over a century ago. Riel was convicted of leading the Métis, the descendants of
Western Prairie Aboriginals and French trappers, in an armed rebellion. In three
one-hour instalments, Newsworld offered (1) a dramatized history of the events
leading to Riel’s trial, including the battles between Métis and government troops;
(2) a mock “re-trial” of Riel, which invited viewers to vote on Riel’s guilt or inno-
cence online; and (3) a studio discussion in which about 20 Métis participants dis-
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cussed Riel, their identity, and their place in Canada. In doing so, the CBC provided
Canadians with an opportunity to revisit one of the more unfortunate and controver-
sial moments in the history of Canada. Also, in inviting viewers to vote on Riel’s
guilt or innocence according to the laws of today, it provided the opportunity to
reconsider the circumstances of his conviction and his place in Canada’s history.
Indeed, I argue that this broadcast should be understood as an attempt to stage a
rhetoric of reconciliation by offering Canadians the opportunity to symbolically
exculpate Riel and, in doing so, to admit the historical injustice of his 1885 convic-
tion and execution. However, while the broadcast was well-meaning and had its
supporters, it was denounced by Métis spokespersons who considered it offensive
or racist, as well as by conservative commentators and historians who dismissed it
as a politically motivated distortion of historical complexity.
In what follows, I will consider the rhetorical dynamic of this broadcast in order
to account for the difficulties that it encountered. As we shall see, the broadcast is
rhetorically problematic because it is directed toward reconciliation while relying
on the rhetorical forms and categories of criminal trials. More precisely, while the
broadcast belongs to the rhetorical genre of “popular trials,” a political rather than
legal genre, it does not develop adequately a non-legal framework to consider all
that “Riel” stands for. As such, the broadcast highlights tensions between reconcil-
iation and forensic judgment as well as between reconciliation as a rhetorical form
and the politics of recognition within a multicultural framework. As we shall see,
the latter proceeds from identity, while the former builds upon the multiplication of
difference.
Riel’s popular trial
In 1885, Louis Riel had been called upon by the Métis to lead them in their strug-
gle against the Canadian government for rights and land. Faced with government
intransigence, Riel had declared a provisional government. The conflict escalated
into an armed rebellion. Battles were fought. Men died; as the prosecution put it,
there were “dead bodies lying on the blood-stained snow” (The Queen v Louis Riel,
1974, p. 72). The Métis and their Indian allies were defeated. Riel could have
escaped to the United States, where he was a naturalized citizen, but instead chose
to surrender. To his surprise, he was charged with the capital crime of high treason
under an act dating from 1351 (25 Edw. III St. 5, c. 2).
Riel’s attorneys were faced with a difficult case. No one denied that Riel was
the leader of the Métis, had proclaimed a provisional government, had authorized
the taking of hostages, and had threatened “a war of extermination” (The Queen v
Louis Riel, 1974, p. 70). The evidence was clear: Riel had led a group that had
defied legally constituted authority violently. In defence of Riel, some still argue
that he did not intend violence, that his threats were posturing and bluster, and that
the Métis took up arms in reasonable anticipation of government violence.
According to historical sources, the precipitating cause of the battle of Duck Lake,
the battle that inaugurated the rebellion, was a remark by Lawrence Clarke to the
Métis on March 18, 1885, that their petitions for redress would be answered by
police bullets and that 500 policemen were coming to capture them (McLean,
1985). This statement, whether actually uttered or only rumoured, transformed the
North–West agitation. Riel is reported to have cried out on hearing of it, “[A]ux
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armes, aux armes” (cited in McLean, 1985, p. 98). However, even if the Métis had
acted out of fear, Riel’s acts were treasonable according to a strict interpretation of
the law. Regardless of his ultimate intention, or of the justness of the laws, Riel’s
acts were such that he did “attempt and endeavour by force and arms to subvert and
destroy the constitution and government” or “did levy and make war against our
said Lady the Queen” as charged (The Queen v Louis Riel, 1974, p. 2, 4). Riel’s
defence was saddled also with the fact that this had not been his first clash with the
Canadian government. In 1870, similar reasons had led him to proclaim a provi-
sional government in a territory under the authority of the Hudson’s Bay Company,
to threaten violence, and to authorize the execution of a Canadian resister con-
demned in a summary procedure incompatible with the principles of British justice.
At that time, for reasons of both policy and expedience, Canada had agreed ulti-
mately to most Métis demands. It created the Province of Manitoba, offered land to
Métis settlers “toward the extinguishment of aboriginal title” (Manitoba Act, S.C.
1870, c. 3), and pardoned Riel and others in exchange for their temporary self-exile. 
Given the evidence in 1885 and Riel’s notoriety—as well as the fact that he
held unorthodox religious views, thought himself a “prophet,” and had spent time
in a mental asylum in the 1870s—Riel’s counsel thought it best to plead insanity,
all the while arguing that his cause, if not his means, was just. However, in accor-
dance with treason trial procedure, Riel was permitted to address the court directly
before the jury’s deliberations. To the dismay of his attorneys, he disavowed the
insanity plea before the jury; it concurred and found him guilty, while nevertheless
recommending mercy. The judge imposed the required sentence of death, to be car-
ried out by leave of the Crown. The Canadian government, under the leadership of
Canada’s first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, ultimately did not heed calls
for clemency, and in the Crown’s name, it ordered Riel’s execution.
Trials are a mechanism, or a discursive procedure, to apply laws to particulari-
ties. But trials are more than that. As Robert Hariman observes, trials offer a “per-
formance of the laws” (Hariman, 1990, p. 17). Trials are performances because they
are staged public events that give presence and voice to law. The proper unfolding
of a trial not only renders justice to particulars, but also recursively constitutes both
the nature of justice and the legitimacy of constitutional authority. Trials matter,
because they are a medium that legitimates the state’s exercise of violence. As such,
trials are rhetorical, both because they are forums in which prosecution and defence
seek to persuade a jury and because they are an implicit public argument for the
rightness of the law. And, since all rhetoric is an occasion for counterargument, tri-
als are an opportunity for members of a polity to contest the law. In most cases, this
does not occur, but there are occasions when a law’s rightness is not taken for
granted or when the law’s application becomes a sign of what many consider a
poorly formed or unjust policy. Such was the case in 1885. 
Riel’s trial fits Robert Hariman’s definition of a “popular trial”: It gained the
attention of a general audience, was characterized by an unusual crime, and elicited
both special media attention and an intense popular response (Hariman, 1990).
Popular trials are occasions in which advocates (both within and without the court-
room) address a public audience, and the fate of the accused is only one aspect of a
larger set of questions that the public is called upon to judge. As such, popular tri-
als are significant beyond the fate of the accused and subsequent jurisprudence, as
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they supply opportunities and materials for advancing causes. Hariman thus consid-
ers that such trials are significant rhetorically and “constitute a genre of the litera-
ture of public life” (Hariman, 1990, p. 5). In other words, popular trials are a
rhetorical resource, providing discursive materials with which to deliberate upon
issues instantiated in a case. 
Trials are sanctioned procedures to produce factual and forensic knowledge
through argumentation. Prosecution and defence make arguments regarding ques-
tions of fact before a judge and jury, who are then called upon to judge whether the
defendant violated the law. In popular trials, social knowledge is also at issue.
According to Thomas Farrell, “Social knowledge comprises conceptions of sym-
bolic relationships among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply
(when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behaviour” (Farrell, 1976, p.
4). Farrell goes on to argue that social knowledge is rhetorical, because it exists by
and through claims in public address, and that it rests upon an attributed—rather
than actual—consensus. Social knowledge is also normative, as it dictates appropri-
ate social, policy, and legal responses to events and states of affairs. As trials per-
form the laws, they enact social knowledge implicitly and, in doing so, also provide
saliency and focus to debates over social knowledge. Furthermore, because trials
are sanctioned by and enact the power of the state, popular trials occupy a central
place on the public stage. As Hariman observes, with reference to the 1925 Scopes
“Monkey” trial concerning the teaching of evolution in a Tennessee public school,
in popular trials “the many voices of the national theatre [are] brought together”
(Hariman, 1990, p. 21). Trials provide a national stage, as they “[require] that peo-
ple of vastly different perspectives recognize a common forum, while allowing
them to keep and project their own voices” (p. 21). 
This was certainly the case in the Riel trial. The trial received major media cov-
erage and served as an anchor for debates on a number of national issues, including
the fate of Canada’s “Indians,” the nature of criminal insanity, the plight of the
Métis, and the Macdonald government’s management of the Northwest. Debates
surrounding the trial were political, partisan, and very public, particularly since
Canadian journalism in the nineteenth century did not categorically split news from
opinion, and newspapers had strong partisan commitments. Opposition parties and
the Grit press charged that the Northwest rebellion was a consequence of bad gov-
ernance, particularly since the government ultimately implemented many of the
Métis’ demands. Many also felt that the government was out to get Riel, who was
charged with high treason, a capital crime, rather than felony treason, a lesser
offence punishable by imprisonment. This argument is bolstered by the fact that the
government elected to try him in the Northwest Territory, the place of the crime,
rather than in the Province of Manitoba. While there were good legal grounds for
doing so, Riel had fewer rights in the Territory. In the Northwest, there were no
grand juries, trials were presided over by magistrates serving at pleasure rather than
tenured judges, juries were of six rather than twelve, and francophone defendants
had no right to francophone jurors. Furthermore, Riel came to stand for more than
himself or even the Métis that he led. Riel was a Montréal-educated French-speak-
ing Catholic. Consequently, his trial and subsequent execution were figured by
many French Canadian politicians, at least those not in the governing party, as an
attack on their race. Wilfrid Laurier, who would later become Prime Minister, mov-
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ingly declared at a Montréal rally the Sunday after the hanging: “Si j’avais été sur
les bords de la Saskatchewan lorsqu’éclata la révolte, j’aurais pris moi-même les
armes contre le gouvernement” (Bélanger, 1986, p. 137). As such, Riel’s trial was
not only an occasion to judge the Conservative government’s Northwest policy, but
also an opportunity to scrutinize Canada’s treatment of its French minority. In addi-
tion, the rebellion and trial highlighted controversies over Canada’s Aboriginal poli-
cies and the place of the Métis in the nation. 
Social knowledge is produced through a variety of public rhetorical forms.
While court proceedings are not directed primarily toward social knowledge, but
toward forensic judgment, popular trials are particularly significant to the formation
of social knowledge, not only because they can call attention to issues, but because
the testimonies, arguments, and unfolding drama of the trial provide materials and
reference points to organize public controversy and debate. 
Hariman asserts that popular trials are effective in contributing to social knowl-
edge because of certain generic characteristics that originate in trial practice:
Hariman identifies four such elements: The adversarial format, the necessity of
decision, the theme of judging character, and the use of official symbols (Hariman,
1990). The first three of these help structure public debate. Public discourse on con-
troversial questions is often diffuse and ongoing. Trials punctuate such discourse.
Trials demand that sides be taken, that judgments be made, and that these judgments
focus on the character of public actors. They reduce the abstraction of cultural
movements and policy questions through concrete cases and actions. Furthermore,
the use of official symbols—and, one could add, the rituals and generic forms that
mark trials and their media coverage—provides a stable and easily recognizable
container for a wide range of symbolic acts. As Hariman explains, official symbols
in a trial are a source of its legitimacy, and they “counteract the anxieties resulting
from adversarial antagonisms” (Hariman, 1990, p. 26). 
Hariman does not consider in detail the role that popular trials play in settling
public controversies, but he is clear that these are not resolved by a jury’s verdict or
a judge’s ruling or sentence. Trials settle factual and forensic questions before the
law. Nevertheless, trials often contribute to the development of social knowledge by
giving rise to interim points of closure. Because popular trials focus and provide
resources for public argument and are marked by “adjudicating discourses” that
examine cultural and political commonplaces critically, they play an important role
in structuring the lifespan of their attendant controversies. In other words, discourse
flares during trials and abates afterwards. Furthermore, popular trials often have as
legacy new forms of social knowledge. Thus, John Lucaites writes that the 1709-10
impeachment trial of Dr. Henry Sacheverell confirmed the existence of an unwrit-
ten right to resistance under the British Constitution (Lucaites, 1990), just as
Celeste Condit and Lawrence Bernabo argue that despite John Scopes’ conviction
for teaching evolution in Tennessee, his popular trial and its fictionalized rendering
on stage and screen as Inherit the Wind discredited the Bible (for a while at least)
as an authoritative text for teaching natural science (Bernabo & Condit, 1990).
Within a strongly constituted framework, popular trials may well serve as a sta-
ble medium to order controversy even as social knowledge is contested and revised.
This follows from the fact that the legitimacy of the trial as a form is granted. The
implications of Riel’s popular trial, however, were more problematic. In Riel’s case,
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proceedings began under a cloud. As noted above, Riel was tried under a four-
teenth-century imperial statute rather than Canadian-authored law and prosecuted
under the rough rules of procedure established for a sparsely settled territory.
Clearly, the government was seeking the death penalty, even if it needed to recur to
a law framed five centuries earlier. As such, one cannot conclude that official sym-
bols conferred legitimacy on the proceedings. At most, one could say that they con-
ferred legal authority. Riel’s supporters, as well as the government’s opponents,
figured his prosecution as malicious. In Parliament, future prime minister Wilfrid
Laurier, sitting in opposition, decried Riel’s execution as a “judicial murder”
(Canada, 1886, p. 110). While the legality of the trial was upheld on appeal, its
legitimacy was tainted. Riel’s popular trial provided occasions to challenge social
knowledge, but it certainly did not contribute to any interim closure. Rather, the
trial became for many an authoritative performance of the injustice of constitution-
ally sanctioned authority. 
Lloyd Bitzer observes that not all rhetorical situations are met with a fitting
response. Some situations are complicated because they consist of multiple exigen-
cies and suffer from a lack of focus (Bitzer, 1968). Hariman, commenting on the
structure of popular trials, observes that “formal closure provides the genre with
both its aesthetic unity and its ability to stimulate and focus debate” (Hariman,
1990, p. 27). The rhetorical situation of Riel’s trial lacked such unity, however, in
part because of the unclear relationship between two exigencies: justice for Riel
(compounded by his insanity plea) and justice for the Métis and the Northwest. At
best, the trial provided rhetorical resources to contest social knowledge and to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of constitutional authority, but it also rendered any assessment
of either Riel’s or Prime Minister Macdonald’s character problematic. Indeed, one
could say that “Riel” became a floating sign, to be claimed variously by competing
advocates. Ultimately, the only consensus produced by the Riel case was the recog-
nition that social knowledge formation in Canada is fundamentally strained. The
legacy of Riel’s trial was not a reworked body of social knowledge, but rather the
undermining of its very possibility, of the capacity to attribute consensus effect-
ively. Dissensus became the norm, splitting French from English, Catholic from
Protestant, and undermining the Conservative Party in Québec. The trial itself
became the site of a wound, of a perceived wrong based on misrecognitions or
negations, and the locus for the expression of resentment.
When the issues at stake in a popular trial are clear, a controversial verdict such
as Riel’s conviction can be productive, focusing discussion on the rightness of the
laws or the justness of the legal process. In Riel’s case, such clarity was lacking.
The prosecution depicted Riel as an evil man who fomented rebellion for personal
gain, while Riel’s defence depicted him as an honourable but mentally ill man con-
fronted by a negligent government. As such, the trial did not force a single clear
topic through which to deliberate the justness of Riel’s sentence. The insanity
defence and the ambiguous verdict ultimately rendered any definitive judgment
regarding Riel’s character or actions problematic. Furthermore, in the public debate,
Riel’s very identity is unstable. He is an “other” for English Canada, but he is
ambiguously Métis or French Canadian. Indeed, even his Catholicism is problem-
atic, as he sought to establish a new papacy in the Northwest. In other words, while
the trial in both its legal and popular aspects focused intensely on Riel’s character,
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it failed to provide adequate resources to answer the question, “Who was Riel?”
Riel’s Newsworld re-trial
If the conflicts at the root of the 1885 rebellion, Riel’s trial, and his subsequent exe-
cution had been settled or forgotten, the Newsworld series could be considered
“mere history,” even if it was of a popular sort. However, given the controversy sur-
rounding the broadcast, it is better understood as a continuation, rather than an
account of, Riel’s popular trial, although in a radically different context and after
much of the dust had settled: Ontario is no longer a bastion of Orange anti-French
sentiment, Europe’s history of colonization has been subjected to continued critique
for close to half a century, and the rights of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were rec-
ognized and affirmed in the Constitution Act. 
Furthermore, the place that Riel holds in Canadian history had already under-
gone a remarkable revision before the series was broadcast, in part because of an
effective ongoing rhetorical campaign by Métis and other Riel advocates for much
of the second half of the twentieth century. In 1962, Riel’s trial was adapted as a
sympathetic play by John Coulter (Coulter, 1968). In 1974, McGill-Queen’s
University Press published the trial transcript as a sort of counterpoint (The Queen
v Louis Riel, 1974). In 1979, the Association of Métis and Non-status Indians of
Saskatchewan petitioned the Canadian government for Riel’s pardon (Association
of Métis and Non-status Indians of Saskatchewan, 1979). In 1982, Canada’s
Constitution Act explicitly recognized and affirmed that Métis have Aboriginal
rights. And in 1998, the Minister of Indian Affairs read a “Statement of
Reconciliation” acknowledging and apologizing for the harm done to Aboriginals
by Canada. Writing in Maclean’s in 1999, Peter C. Newman cited a recent Angus
Reid poll in which 75% of Canadians indicated that they thought Riel’s execution
was wrong and Newman described Riel as “one of our genuine frontier heroes”
(Newman, 1999, p. 48). Thus, while Métis advocates and organizations continue to
press for rights and entitlements, Riel’s reputation had in large part been trans-
formed by the time of the broadcast. The only thing his historical “rehabilitation”
still required was a formal apology or gesture of acknowledgment. This was pro-
vided by Newsworld’s “re-trial,” when it asked Canadians to vote online on
whether or not Riel was guilty. By making Canadians virtual jurors, the series cre-
ated an occasion to make a public gesture of reconciliation.
In Hariman’s understanding, the kernels of popular trials are the legal proceed-
ings, which are amplified, refracted, commented upon, and even “sampled” in the
public sphere. Trials become “popular” as they receive media attention and acquire
rhetorical significance. All trials have forensic significance, as they decide the fate
of the accused. Some have legal significance, as they give rise to jurisprudence.
Popular trials have rhetorical significance, as they provide materials for public
argument. As such, the popular aspect of trials is fundamentally not concerned with
guilt or innocence per se. Its interest is in the social, cultural, or political concerns
attached to a given case or verdict. In Newsworld’s “re-trial,” this was the case as
well, but in a paradoxical manner, since it called upon viewers to reach a verdict
even as it dispensed with the original trial. 
Dramatizations of popular trials are not uncommon. Usually, however, even
when condensed and simplified, they retain the central arguments of the original
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trial proceedings. They contribute to public understanding and debate by replaying
key parts of the original trial. Thus, for example, while the play and subsequent film
Inherit the Wind fictionalizes the trial of John Scopes for teaching evolution, it
retains the dramatic moment where Clarence Darrow calls William Jennings Bryan,
the populist defender of biblical authority, to the stand and makes a fool of him
through a pointed examination of his inconsistent beliefs. Even though in the film
the names were changed, a romantic angle was added, and the Bryan character died
at the trial’s conclusion rather than less than a week afterward, one can still recog-
nize the arguments and drama present in the original trial. 
In contrast, the Riel “re-trial” bore no resemblance to the original proceeding,
and it certainly provided no basis for understanding why the original jury, while rec-
ommending mercy, found Riel guilty. The only witness to speak in the broadcast
was the character of Riel, despite the fact that Riel was not even examined in the
original trial, but only exercised his right to address the jury before their delibera-
tions. Furthermore, the insanity plea at the centre of Riel’s original defence was not
addressed. The “re-trial” focused on Riel’s goals or cause, rather than on the com-
mission of specific acts that would have been illegal then as now. As such, the three-
part broadcast coheres as a complex instance of advocacy directed toward Riel’s
exculpation in the popular imagination and the presentation of the Métis cause in a
sympathetic light, rather than as an exploration of historical complexity. The broad-
cast, in its conception and execution, is a call for recognition—for a gesture of good
will—through a non-guilty verdict.
The series had a complex rhetorical objective. Its aim was to promote reconcil-
iation by leading Canadians to consider Riel’s story and then cast a (not guilty) ver-
dict, where the casting itself would be proof of a spirit of reconciliation, through a
rhetoric of enactment1 addressed to the Métis and indeed all Canadians. It did not
simply aim to convince viewers that Riel was a victim and not guilty, or that the
Métis were mistreated, but instead sought to change the very relationship between
Canadians and the Métis. The complexity of the objective was matched by the com-
plexity of the rhetoric itself. As noted above, a tension exists between the re-trial
framework and the production of social knowledge. There is a further tension
between the form of knowledge each episode is ostensibly directed toward and the
epistemic underpinnings of reconciliation.
The three episodes of the series consisted, respectively, of a historical docu-
mentary, a mock trial offering sets of arguments concerning Riel’s motives and
involvement in the 1885 rebellion, and a “town meeting”–style public-affairs dis-
cussion. Generally, these correspond to three orders of knowledge. The first episode
sought to offer empirical knowledge, providing viewers with an account of the
events leading to Riel’s trial and conviction. The second was concerned with justice
and sought to construct forensic knowledge, dealing with Riel’s moral character and
guilt or innocence. The third aimed to produce social knowledge, combining epide-
ictic and deliberative discourse as it celebrated certain values in the present and
explored the policy implications of the Métis rebellions and their legacy. Each of
these, at least superficially, spoke a different order of “truth.”
More specifically, the series consisted of three one-hour instalments. The first
hour presented itself as offering empirical truth though a dramatized history, with
soundtrack, that told the story of the Métis, focusing on the difficulties they faced
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as a result of Canada’s annexation and colonization of the Northwest, the role
played by Riel in advancing their demands, and the rebellion itself. Despite speak-
ing in history’s voice, this account was not disinterested, but was in the service of
the episode that would follow. That is to say, it offered a coherent narratio (rhetor-
ical narrative) that could serve as groundwork for Riel’s defence. While literary the-
ory considers narratives in terms of the way that they create a spatio-temporal
diagetic space that gives rise to identifications, rhetorical theory considers narrative
to be that part of a speech that orders the elements of a case. As a rhetorical narra-
tio, rather than a dialectical narrative, this history episode was structured to provide
coherence over complexity. As Lucaites and Condit note in their discussion of rhet-
oric and narrative:
The narratio played a key role in [forensic] oration, as it was designed to
influence the judge’s interpretation and understanding of the proof of the
case. It achieved this end by characterizing the “nature of the subject”
through the telling of facts in story form. (p. 94-95)
In traditional classifications of oratory, the narratio follows the introduction
and precedes arguments or “proofs.” The narratio is not innocent or unbiased. It
selects and orders the facts of a case in a manner that favours and serves the proofs
that will follow. As such, the diagesis that it offers is interested, and it is told from
an advocate’s point of view. Furthermore—and this was certainly the case with the
Newsworld episode—it exploits the process of identification. That is to say, the
point of view that it offers promotes pathos or audience sympathy. The history les-
son provided by the first hour, excerpted from the CBC’s major production Canada:
A People’s History, was not patently false, but it offered a Métis- and Riel-centred
account, disposing its audience toward a not-guilty verdict as it sought to fuse the
viewer’s and Riel’s interpretive horizons. Tout savoir, c’est tout pardoner.
The second hour of the series consisted of the re-trial itself, which gestured
toward the generic constraints of trials. The trial was set in a mock courtroom,
presided over by former justice Thomas Berger of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia, who wore judicial robes. Two prominent Canadian litigators, also in
robes, stood before him as Crown prosecutor and defence attorney, respectively. A
third attorney, a well-known constitutional activist, took the witness stand in period
dress as Louis Riel. This staging did little, of course, to hide the rhetorical charac-
ter of the exercise, even though the re-trial format made the ultimate rhetorical pur-
pose unclear. Speaking with typical bluntness, National Post columnist Andrew
Coyne dismissed the re-trial as “rigged,” with a “stacked jury”:
And check the lineups! For Riel, you had Edward Greenspan, Canada’s
foremost criminal lawyer, as defence counsel. You had Guy Bertrand, a
lawyer by trade but an actor by calling, cutting a compelling figure as Riel
himself. And you had Thomas Berger—Thomas Berger!—as the judge.
Perhaps Judge Berger’s lifetime of passionate commitment to native causes
should not have disqualified him to hear the case—though try to imagine a
passionate opponent of native rights, or even a mild skeptic, being assigned
the same role—but his charge to the jury, in essence a second summation
for the defence, surely would.
And for the prosecution? An eminent Crown counsel? A noted historian?
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No, a securities lawyer. Alan Lenczner acquitted himself well enough, I
suppose, but it was clear that his role was to be the cartoon baddie of the
piece, the avatar of heedless “progress.” (Coyne, 2002, p. A26) 
While Coyne’s characterization of Lenczner is harsh, the securities lawyer 
certainly lacked the notoriety of the other participants. Greenspan, Berger, and
Bertrand were all well known to the Canadian public. Berger represented the
Nisga’a Indians before the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1973 “Calder” case,
which confirmed that the Nisga’a still held title to their land. He also was commis-
sioner of the McKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry that concluded that the project
could not proceed without negotiating Aboriginal claims. Greenspan is without a
doubt Canada’s best-known criminal lawyer, having many high-profile clients,
including Brian Mulroney and, more recently, Conrad Black. Finally, Guy Bertrand
was at the time a highly visible constitutional lawyer. A former candidate for the
leadership of the Parti Québécois, he had repudiated the sovereigntist project and
become involved in a court challenge to the constitutionality of a possible Québec
succession, which had inspired the federal government to refer to the Supreme
Court of Canada the question of Québec’s right to secede.
The third hour of the series was the most rhetorically complex and interesting
of the three, although it was organized in response to the first two and focused not
on the past, but on the present and future. Originally, it was intended to provide a
forum for reconciliatory dialogue between Métis and non-Métis Canadians, but ulti-
mately, it consisted of Métis participants only (except for Newsworld moderator
Anne Petrie). In response to the strong objections of some Métis leadership, the for-
mat had been changed to ensure that the Métis would have a voice: Approximately
20 Métis, many of whom were prominent, gave their views on Métis identity, the
place of the Métis in Canada, and the re-trial broadcast itself. 
I will return to the third hour below. For the moment, I will consider the rhetor-
ical implications of the history and mock re-trial episodes. Given the unsettled place
that Riel holds in Canadian history, the re-trial cannot be dismissed simply as a the-
atrical or a pedagogical device, designed to attract viewers and media attention. On
the contrary, the re-trial stands as a continuation or reprise of the original popular
trial, offering an occasion to repair the breach in social knowledge caused by the
original events. While Tony Belcourt, the leader of the Métis Nation of Ontario,
objected to the re-trial, in part because it again subjected the Métis to judgment, no
reasonable commentator would have expected Riel to suffer an Internet conviction.
Thus, while the broadcast was billed as a “re-trial” and the second episode had the
props and conventions of a trial, it did not re-enact the forensic enquiry that made
up the bulk of the original trial. Trials are dry affairs, for the most part concerned
with establishing factual details through an agonistic process that can then be assim-
ilated into a rhetorical narrative of human intentions and actions. In the re-trial seg-
ment, we are left with Riel on the stand, answering questions posed by defence and
prosecution. Riel thus is given the opportunity to figure the actions for which he is
charged in his own terms. The emphasis is thus in large part on his character, and
the trial drifts from forensic to epideictic rhetoric, from rhetoric that is concerned
with judging the justice of past event to rhetoric that praises community values in
the present. While Riel’s answers were in large measure taken from his speeches
and writings, the questions put to him were not from the original trial. How could
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they be? In 1885, he had not taken the stand. The prosecution’s original case was
re-stated, but with neither witnesses nor evidence, and it took the form of a cross-
examination. Riel was offered the opportunity to rebut the charges and explain his
state of mind, but without an insanity plea to cloud the issues. We have a trial’s
generic markers: the process appeared adversarial, had official symbols, the ques-
tion of character was central, and a decision was called for. The complexities and
ambiguities of law, evidence, and situated judgment, however, were all absent.
Indeed, viewers were not asked to judge Riel’s guilt on the basis of the original
statute, but on unspecified “laws of today” that were further reduced to Justice
Berger’s instructions to focus on whether Riel intended to “levy war,” without also
adding that intention should apply to specific treasonable acts, and not only to a
general abstract purpose. 
Gesturing toward the generic constraints of popular trials, while freed of the
duty of actually dispensing justice in accordance with the law, the re-trial became a
referendum of sorts on Riel’s character, the results of which could stand as a rheto-
ric of enactment, as a reconciliatory gesture that also asserts a social knowledge
claim. In other words, the vote could be figured as affirmation of a new attributed
consensus. Finally, the vote’s outcome could stand in further rhetorical argument as
an inartificial2 (i.e., non-rhetorical) proof of Canadians’ interpretation of the Riel
affair and as an admission of the commission of an injustice. This finds its confir-
mation in Greenspan’s remark, with the announcement of the “verdict,” that he
would move forward to petition the Canadian cabinet to posthumously overturn
Riel’s conviction (Jenish, 2002). 
If viewed as a single text disconnected from any historical or political context,
one could conceivably interpret the broadcast as “merely” educational or informa-
tive, or perhaps even as entertainment. It would be an error to do so, however, par-
ticularly in the context of the Canadian government’s 1998 statement of apology
and reconciliation for its treatment of Aboriginals, the Aboriginal rights that are rec-
ognized in Canada’s constitution, and ongoing legal and political processes by
which Aboriginals, including Métis, seek to have their claims recognized. The
broadcast was rhetorical. Certainly, the broadcast simplified Riel’s case and left a
story far less damning legally than the original trial, but Riel’s guilt was far less
important to the broadcast than his place in the Canadian imagination. Morton, who
introduced the publication of the Riel trial transcript by the University of Toronto
Press, had remarked years earlier that popular treatments of Riel did not offer his-
tory, but “heritage.” In this vein, the broadcast offered a simplified history in the
service of nation-building. With the bluster typical of conservative columnists,
Coyne responded by deriding its rhetorical character while offering a rhetoric of his
own. Though expressing sympathy toward Riel, he insisted that Riel’s champions
ignored the clear evidence of his treasonable acts and would make him a hero even
as they would reduce John A. Macdonald to a villain and Canada to an evil scheme. 
While Coyne’s response comes as no surprise, what accounts for the broad-
cast’s chilly reception among the Métis, or at least Métis spokespersons? University
of Saskatchewan law professor Paul Chartrand, active in the area of Aboriginal con-
stitutional rights, denounced the broadcast as “socially, morally and politically irre-
deemable” (Boswell, 2002, p. A10). Gerald Morin, president of the Métis National
Council (MNC), objected strongly to the project. In part, what was at stake was the
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symbolic ownership of Riel, of who might speak for him. Morin objected to the fact
that the Métis were not consulted during the original production, to which
Greenspan countered, “Louis Riel is part of Canadian history and therefore belongs
to all Canadians. There is no merit in any claim against this enterprise” (Curry,
2002, p. A1). In a sense, Greenspan is right. The Métis do not have privileged
access to the historical record, and their investment in Riel’s ethos cannot be pro-
prietary. But what Morin’s objection speaks to is a perceived lack of recognition,
which is furthermore amplified by the broadcast’s forensic form, even as it disre-
garded the original trial. As he put it:
We know that Riel was innocent, but do not believe we should be rewrit-
ing history in order to deal with the injustices committed against him. If
people truly want to address the injustices perpetuated against Riel, they
should urge the government of Canada to honourably deal with what he
fought and died for; namely, the rights, land, continued existence of our
people, the Métis, within the Canadian federation. (Morin, 2002, p. A19)
Clearly, the re-trial as a gesture of reconciliation was in some respects a failure,
despite the 87% acquittal. In what follows, I will argue that this arises because its
complex rhetorical aim did not find a fitting form, in part because of the complex-
ity of broadcast, but more specifically because of the tensions between its forms of
truth and because of the epistemic requirement of reconciliation itself.
Truth, recognition, and reconciliation
As we have seen in this paper, “truth” is not a simple category. Just as social knowl-
edge is an opinion, or doxa, accompanied by a claim of rightness, so does “truth”
rest upon interpretations and judgments. Also, truth clearly has something to do
with reconciliation. Moving beyond conflicts or the experience of wounds at the
very least requires an understanding of what is being overcome or left behind. But
what is the relationship of truth to such understanding? The South African experi-
ence is most helpful in addressing this question.3
The relationship of truth to reconciliation was confronted most directly in
South Africa, in the context of the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) to assist in the passage from apartheid to a non-racial democ-
racy. The final report of the commission identifies four kinds of truth relevant to the
reconciliatory process: (1) “empirical and forensic truth,” concerned with the record
of events; (2) “personal and narrative truth,” consisting in the lived and told expe-
rience of individuals; (3) “social truth,” the “truth of experience that is established
through interaction, discussion and debate,” (Albie Sachs cited in South Africa,
1999, p. 113); and finally (4) healing truth, “the kind of truth that places facts and
what they mean within the context of human relationships—both amongst citizens
and between the state and its citizens” (South Africa, 1999, p. 113.) 
Defenders of the TRC have argued the superiority of its model of enquiry over
that found in trials for overcoming the legacy of systematic injustice. Trials, like
conventional histories, are concerned with establishing empirical truth, but their
scope is quite narrow, since their focus is on specific acts and the guilt or innocence
of particular parties. There are a number of consequences to this form. Most impor-
tantly, its privileging of the first type of truth subordinates the others. This certainly
occurred in Riel’s original trial, which focused on Riel’s acts and his sanity rather
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than the broader system of motives, and also, if to a lesser extent, in the Newsworld
re-trial, because it was directed toward a verdict. Neither provided an adequate
forum for the “presencing” of Métis and non-Métis experience. Speech was
directed toward forming judgments, not fostering intersubjective understanding. 
In a trial, the suffering of victims, the relevant social truths, and the possibility
of healing are not primary concerns. This is compensated for in popular trials, as
they give rise to public discourses that move beyond the questions facing the court.
This occurred with Riel’s trial in 1885, as well as through the discussions surround-
ing the “re-trial.” Even so, the broadcast itself in large measure failed as a rhetori-
cal reconciliation: It offered only limited support for the expression of personal,
social, and healing truth, because the history and the mock trial explicitly adopted
a forensic frame. The “re-trial” called for judgment, instead of understanding.
While ultimately the broadcast led to a reassessment of the entire historical episode,
its “hook” was for viewers to judge Riel and, by association, the Métis. Belcourt
found this particularly offensive. The pragmatics of forensic judgment strip the
Métis of their sovereignty: They find themselves in the dock and as such disenfran-
chised and subordinated to the authority of others. Belcourt succinctly recognized
this dynamic when he stated in the latter part of the third hour of the broadcast: “I
suppose I can breathe a sigh of relief along with the rest of us about the outcome of
the vote, but I don’t like the way we were put through this roller coaster emotional
ride, all of our people.” Furthermore, while the broadcast sought to reconcile
Canadians through a new trial, the process and pragmatics of truth-telling such rec-
onciliation requires was lacking. Even though Riel took the stand in the second
episode, the first two episodes of the broadcast provided no opportunity for today’s
Métis to tell the truth of their experience, as following from events revisited by the
trial, nor for that matter could other Canadians express their own experiences and
understandings. While such telling is not particularly relevant to the historical-legal
forensic frame of these episodes, it is fundamental to efforts at reconciliation, par-
ticularly because the first Métis demand is to be recognized.
The broadcast was certainly rhetorical, and it offered new social knowledge,
but its capacity to satisfy a call for truth was highly compromised. Just as it did not
have the types of truth the TRC report considers fundamental to a process of recon-
ciliation, it did not actually have the forensic process of a real trial, either, and so
the details of the original trial over a century ago, just like current historical debates,
were ignored by most of the television audience. Commenting on the ongoing revi-
sion of the history of Riel, several years before the broadcast, Desmond Morton
observed: “Canadians in 1998 are free to use Riel as they please, much as children
use dolls to learn how to socialize and to fantasize. Riel the symbol, after all, is her-
itage, to be exploited for collective self-esteem, victim status and the indoctrination
of the young. If heritage makes happiness, let’s do it. History. . . is something else”
(Morton, 1998, p. A7). The broadcast, as heritage, was sympathetic toward Riel, but
even Métis critics objected to its revisionism (Brennae, 2002). Métis leaders want
recognition of Métis status through policy, not symbolic gestures. 
Newsworld’s re-trial fails as a gesture of reconciliation because it imagines that
its work can be performed by perpetrators or their proxies, as they present them-
selves refigured before those who have suffered. As the South African experience
has made clear, reconciliation cannot begin until victims and perpetrators tell their
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own stories. The re-trial also fails because it privileges the telling of a “happy
truth,” and hence the proffering of new social knowledge, over the difficult
encounter with complexity and the bringing to presence of the other three forms of
truth, which may not be reducible to a simple narrative account of villains and vic-
tims, of innocent and guilty. There is no “working through.” Finally, the broadcast
fails because neither its producers nor its critics are committed to the unsettling at
the heart of reconciliation. 
Writing with an eye to the South African case, but out of Pauline theology and
Hegelian philosophy, Erik Doxtader has observed that 
reconciliation is a rhetorical performance and norm of rhetorical practice
that productively opposes the definitional logic that sustains identitarian
thinking and some forms of identity-based politics. Its expression chal-
lenges but does not negate the law of non-contradiction, the violence of
precedent, and the power of self and collective constitution. In this rhetor-
ical opposition to identity, reconciliation performs a conceptual and tropo-
logical turn: a movement between violence and understanding that invents
and enacts the potential for speech. (pp. 269-270)
For Doxtader, reconciliation occurs in the interruption of speech and in the cre-
ation of conditions to begin again. Reconciliation includes a moment of “letting go”
of identity’s investments in the positions of perpetrator and victim, but without
naïve amnesia. In contrast, the re-trial broadcast, in its form and execution, is pred-
icated upon definitional logic. First, the forensic form in general requires stable cat-
egories, such as judge and accused, guilt and innocence. Second, since the
broadcast offers Riel as synecdoche for a historical episode, and then calls for a
judgment on Riel, it promotes the containing of identity through a single judgment.
Third, in revising the third episode to exclusively feature Métis voices, it repro-
duced the identitarian thinking at the core of their own opposition to the broadcast.
While “Métis” in the nineteenth century meant “half-breed,” itself a term not then
considered offensive (and indeed used by Riel), and “métis” more generally
denotes a thing or person of mixed origin or substance, Métis advocates do not fig-
ure themselves as being between cultures or possessing plural identities. They have
no interest in being the poster children for postmodern theories of anti-identity. On
the contrary, they figure themselves as having a proper and distinct identity arising
from a synthesis of Aboriginal and French elements. For Métis advocates, reconcil-
iation passes through recognition, which means through an acknowledgment of
their identity, and subsequent negotiations as a distinct people with the Canadian
government regarding the modalities of their self-government.
Doxtader’s understanding of reconciliation leads one to question whether it can
be compatible with such a form of recognition, which Charles Taylor has identified
as being at the centre of “multiculturalism,” the Canadian approach to plurality. The
Métis seek recognition, and yet the “politics of recognition” is subtended by a pol-
itics of identity (Gutmann, 1992), which has “been shaped by the growing ideal of
authenticity” (Taylor, 1992, p. 36). Thus, it is clear that for Métis advocates, as well
as for Newsworld’s producers, Métis identity precedes and is the basis for the pro-
duction of any truth. Of course, at one level recognition and reconciliation are in
harmony, since recognition implies communication and forms of discourse directed
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toward understanding. However, for many, authenticity is the basis for a critical
standard to judge recognition. This raises the stakes in a manner not necessarily
compatible with reconciliation. As Taylor observes, “On the social plane, the under-
standing that identities are formed in open dialogue, unshaped by predefined social
script, has made the politics of equal recognition more central and stressful [, for]
the withholding of recognition can be [regarded] as a form of oppression” (Taylor,
1992, p. 36). And yet, in the context of reconciliation, as recognition and under-
standing undermine hierarchies and establish commonalities, entrenched identities
are at risk, particularly if those identities are tied to some kind of debt to the past,
for as Taylor puts it in a different context, “My own identity crucially depends on
my dialogical relation with others” (p. 34).
Canadian multiculturalism admits the right of cultural groups, particularly
French Canadians and Aboriginals, to be recognized in their particularity and to be
granted a degree of self-government and hence separate development. In 1885, the
Métis did not benefit (or suffer) from this model of apartness.4 Despite the existence
of some Métis communities, they were not legally recognized as a people or nation.
They were recognized as a distinct group in the vernacular, but they were consid-
ered Canadians, who at best deserved to be compensated for any claim to land
derived from the Native part of their mixed ancestry. Over a century later, Métis
communities and institutions still exist, and their leaders press for greater recogni-
tion and collective rights.
Newsworld’s production of the Riel documentary exacerbated the feeling of
non-recognition experienced by many Métis. To compensate for this, the producers
altered the format of the third hour, which had originally been intended to be the
site of dialogue and exchange between Métis and non-Métis. As Belcourt put it,
“They had no idea how strongly we felt about having been left out in the first place.
… So they decided to change the third part of the show to be exclusively about the
Métis” (Boswell, 2002, p. A8). The original plan was for Métis and other Canadians
to participate in a studio discussion of Riel, his trial, and the place of Métis and
other Aboriginals in Canada. In the revised format, the only non-Métis was
Newsworld’s Anne Petrie, who moderated the discussion. This third segment pro-
vided prominent Métis figures, some of Riel’s relatives, and some students the
opportunity to express how they felt ignored, repressed, and indeed conquered.
While most ultimately conceded that the re-trial had done some good in raising
awareness about the Métis and welcomed Riel’s 87% Internet acquittal (which they
received with applause), they still objected to its production, its version of events,
and its featuring of the argument that Riel was more French Canadian than Métis. 
A significant theme in the discussion segment was the nature of Métis identity.
Riel’s Métis identity was not challenged in the original trial. Such a challenge dur-
ing the re-trial can be understood as a pedagogical device to clarify who the Métis
are; this certainly led to its discussion in the third segment, but it also triggered anx-
ieties over non-recognition. Tony Belcourt, president of the Ontario Métis
Federation, denounced as racist the idea advanced by the prosecution in the re-trial
that ancestry is determinant of Métis status and noted the parallel between that argu-
ment and one advanced by the Government of Ontario in a recent land claim case.
There was strong consensus in the studio that the Métis are a people or nation, but
that being Métis is not determined by a percentage of Métis “blood.” As one student
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explained, the Métis National Council had established a definition for being Métis,
which includes some Métis ancestry, self-identification with the Métis nation, and
general recognition by the Métis community. As such, Métis identity has a voluntary
component. This led to actress and filmmaker Genevieve Pelletier and student Riel
Dion, clearly in the minority, admitting that they are reluctant to identify as Métis;
the former because of a lack of knowledge of the culture, the latter because he did
not experience himself as such and because such self-ascription would imply taking
on a duty or set of responsibilities. Dion said, “I haven’t identified with it, even
though my grandmother [sitting beside him] has, and that thing has a lot to do with
the upbringing. . . . It has to be seen from both sides, I think. Before I make a deci-
sion like that, I feel that I would have to weigh both sides, because it is something
that is irreversible, I can’t go back and say ‘no, I’m not a Métis anymore, yes I am a
Métis.’” Quite bitter, Belcourt said that such remarks were hurtful. He blamed the
student’s ambivalence on racist arguments and attitudes and asserted that he consid-
ered Métis identity to be fundamental and that those who did not experience it were
victims of propaganda and policies of assimilation.
Only in this third hour of the series, in the disruption of predictable narratives,
did we see a process that might open toward reconciliation. Visibly moved, Nelson
Sanderson of the Manitoba Métis Cultural Club asserted that viewing the first two
hours with his family had made him proud and that he was not offended by the
broadcast because he saw the “bigger picture”: that the broadcast presented Riel to
the country. In that third hour, personal or narrative truth could be given voice. Even
then, however, productive truth-telling was tenuous, because discussion was
policed by community authorities and because statements often oscillated between
the expression of resentment and the restating of ideologically entrenched positions
that very few were willing to question. 
Given that most of the participants not only define themselves as Métis, but have
prominent roles in Métis organizations, it is hardly surprising that they spoke for the
Métis as a nation and that their suffering was from non-recognition. Consequently, the
dominant tone was one of frustration and defensiveness. Métis advocates expressed
their truth, but this did not lead to an enquiry into its nature. Rather, it led to pedagogy.
That is to say, while they saw themselves as victims of government policies, most had
little interest in offering testimony or giving themselves over to an encounter with their
pain. There was no moment of purgation or catharsis. There was advocacy: They spoke
as appropriate to their roles, insisted on their existence as a people, decried their treat-
ment by government authorities, praised Riel as the founder of their people, and
demanded recognition. As such, the rush to a meta-narrative of truth by the well-mean-
ing producers of the program found its echo in the dominant Métis discourse. Métis
advocates do seek a forum where they can express the truth of their experience, but
only from within their narrative of community, and only as it serves the interests of
advocacy. Thus, even in this third hour, we had only a limited departure from forensic
truth, because of the dominance of ideological, rather than personal, narrative. This
may give rise to understanding, to recognition and respect, to deliberative democracy,
or to political negotiation, but reconciliation in Doxtader’s sense was constrained. The
third hour certainly promoted talk, but it did not overcome identity-based boundaries.
Ultimately, of course, this is not the fault of the Métis; it arises from both the form of
the broadcast and the very logic of Canadian–Aboriginal relations. 
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Canada was for the most part colonized without the overt military conquest of
its Native populations. Competing European powers entered into alliances with
“Indian” tribes in order to advance their interests. Ultimately, most of Canada was
acquired through treaty, albeit between unequal parties, as North American Indian
ways of life were undermined by contact, trade, disease, and settlement. These
tribes, usually now termed “First Nations,” acquired legal status as they were rec-
ognized as distinct nations under the Crown and ceded territories in exchange for
reserved areas, traditional hunting and fishing rights, and a government commit-
ment (“fiduciary obligation”) to provide for their education and welfare. Their rela-
tionship to Canada has not for as much been happy. Their populations have
dwindled, and they have regularly encountered racist attitudes, complained of
unmet treaty obligations, and suffered under ineffective government policies
designed to encourage their assimilation into the Canadian mainstream. Perhaps for
this reason, and because of their demographic and economic marginality, First
Nations have insisted on their difference and treaty rights, even though some argue
that the treaty system is Canada’s apartheid and perpetuates inferior status. What
they hold to is a promise of separate development. 
The Métis seek a similar arrangement. Like the First Nations, Canada’s Métis
do not want to be simply Canadian, but assert the principle that they constitute dis-
tinct nations under law with collective rights. Canada’s 1982 constitution recog-
nizes that the Métis also have some Aboriginal rights as the country’s prior
occupants, and Métis leaders seek a constructive dialogue that will consider their
demands. Such dialogue requires of course that they be recognized and heard,
which implies some form of reconciliation, as well as some faith in the “works of
words.” 
What is nevertheless unclear, however, given the categorical frameworks of
both forensic judgment and constitutionally established identitarian categories, is
the degree of reconciliation that can take place. Reconciliation demands recognition
of the other, but not the full acceptance of the other’s self-constitution and terms.
The process of reconciliation risks coming to an end when recognition slides into a
commitment to given identities, because identity fixes and therefore limits appre-
hension. When recognition grasps what identity prefigures, two options are then
open: Either recognition forms the basis for regulated talk that seeks common
ground from fixed positions, or recognition initiates a displacement, where identi-
ties are loosened and opened to a future based on re-figuration.
Notes 
1. A rhetoric of enactment is one in which the rhetorical performance itself proves or makes real that
which is claimed. For a discussion of rhetorical enactment, see Campbell & Jamieson (1978).
2. In rhetorical theory, inartificial proofs would usually include physical evidence, contracts, and tes-
timony given under oath or extracted through torture. Artificial proofs, in contrast, would consist of
what we today might call circumstantial evidence. Of course, even in antiquity, the unreliability of
sworn statements and torture-based confessions was recognized. Indeed, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle
acknowledges that all inartificial proofs require rhetorical interpretation and framing, and hence that
even material evidence requires artificial proof to persuade effectively.
3. In South Africa, the debate over the proper way of dealing with systematic past injustices was
between the creation of a Truth Commission with some form of amnesty and the prosecution of per-
petrators. For insight into this debate, see the essays in Villa-Vicencio & Doxtader (2003). 
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4. When Canadians are in his audience, South African satirist Pieter-Dirk Uys makes a point of thank-
ing them on behalf of the former apartheid regime for the inspiration provided by the Canadian
reservation system. In Canada, the charge that the treatment of Aboriginals in Canada was apartheid-
like has been made a number of times, most notably by Justice Berger with reference to the treat-
ment of Nisga’a in British Columbia (cited in Raunet, 1984). David Raunet develops that view in a
stinging critique of Canadian policy toward its Native population (Raunet, 1984). “Canada’s
Apartheid” was also the name of an in-depth examination of the status of and issues facing Canadian
Natives published by The Globe and Mail (Stackhouose, 2001). Some Canadian tax-reform advo-
cates also use the term when decrying the “special status” provided by the Indian Act, which they
argue has significant costs to the taxpayer while reinforcing Aboriginals’ subordinated status (see
Fiss, 2004).
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